



Nigerian Government and Terrorists' Negotiation: The Case of Chibok School Girls

**Gabriel T. Abumbe¹, Ojie A. Peter¹, Emmanuel Eyo Etim^{2*}
and Augustine Akah³**

¹*Department of Political Science, University of Calabar, Nigeria.*

²*Department of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN), Lagos, Nigeria.*

³*Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Calabar, Nigeria.*

Authors' contributions

This work was carried out in collaboration between all authors. All authors read and approved the final manuscript

Article Information

DOI: 10.9734/ARJASS/2018/37236

Editor(s):

(1) Raffaella Giovagnoli, Pontifical Lateran University, Piazza San Giovanni in Laterano 4, Rome, Italy.

Reviewers:

(1) Oyewole Simon Oginni, Pan African University, Cameroon.

(2) Omololu Fagbadebo, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

(3) Nathan Hussaini Chiroma, Pan Africa Christian University, Nairobi, Kenya.

(4) Salihu Mohammed Niworu, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University, Nigeria.

(5) Tatiana Waisberg, Escola Superior Dom Helder Camara, Brazil.

Complete Peer review History: <http://www.sciencedomain.org/review-history/22913>

Original Research Article

Received 6th September 2017
Accepted 20th November 2017
Published 29th January 2018

ABSTRACT

The question of how potent negotiation is in ending violent terrorist campaigns has remained unanswered. This is because terrorist negotiation is morally repugnant as it is politically necessary. This study investigated the pros and cons of Nigerian government and BK negotiation. It examines some conditions that are necessary for fruitful negotiations as well as some factors that could contribute to failed negotiations; using the games theory. A qualitative method of data analysis was adopted in this study. Findings revealed that negotiation is one of the most viable options in the hands of the Nigerian Government to restore peace in the country and stop the continuous killings by BK. However, this negotiation should be done between representatives of the government and appropriate authorities within the sect. This paper recommends that terrorist negotiation should remain as the last resort and negotiation process should commence only when every

*Corresponding author: Email: emmaetim1@gmail.com;

other options have failed. Also, relevant bodies, stakeholders, Non-Governmental Organizations and the general public should be involved in the fight against BK and other insurgent groups.

Keywords: Nigerian government; BK; terrorism; negotiation; lasting peace.

ABBREVIATIONS

TTP : *Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan*
AQ : *Al-Qaeda*
AS : *Al-Shabab*
BK : *Boko Haram*

1. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism as a concept is yet to enjoy a universally accepted definition [1]. The results to attain a definition that elicits universal acceptance have been frustrating so far because the predicament of defining lies in its subjectivity. There are clear contrasts in perception for those in authority, onlookers, public opinion, victims or perpetrators [2], for those who condemn or condone terrorism. The rationality of terrorist negotiation has been supported and questioned by various scholars. Majority of these scholars are seriously concerned about the emotional aftermath of terrorist attacks [3]. Governments after governments have pledged never to negotiate with terrorists. But they almost always end up doing so [4]. Talking to terrorists is as morally unacceptable as it is politically indispensable [5].

One of the major reasons why some scholars of terrorism and policy makers have strongly disagreed with terrorist negotiation is that it legitimizes terrorist groups and their means. To these set of persons therefore, talking to terrorists can only incite insurgency and destroy the fabric of democracy [6,7]. Other arguments against negotiating with terrorists include: First, that negotiating encourages more terrorism by giving into their demands and putting lives at risk. Second, it legitimizes terrorists and undermines international efforts to eliminate terrorism [8]. It makes no meaning if the government should enter into negotiation with a group whose demand it cannot understand or satisfy [3]. Further, terrorist negotiation is not a guarantee that terrorist groups will cease their brutal activities. Rather, over the years, terrorist groups that can into negotiations with the government or other negotiators have continued to be active in their violence.

Another group of scholars believes that there is absolutely no harm in negotiating with terrorist groups, especially if the negotiation is aimed at serving the lives of citizens or to possibly reduce their suffering and injuries. In Nigeria, the fear of insecurity is on the increase and has been compounded by the rising waves of terrorism since the country returned to democratic rule in 1999 [9]. The most fundamental source of insecurity in Nigeria today is terrorism which is traceable to religious fanaticism and intolerance particularly in Islam dominated states of Nigeria [10]. The current study seeks to examine the pros and cons of Nigeria's negotiation with BK. It will consider the no negotiation policy by selected countries, as well as the conditions necessary for fruitful negotiations in Nigeria.

2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Within the context of this research, some concepts are recurrently utilized. Therefore, in order to ensure adequate understanding of this study, its validity and reliability, these concepts should be clarified [11].

2.1 Terrorism

The concept of terrorism is a contested concept in the literature [12]. The attempt to have a universal definition of the concept has been frustrating so far because the predicament of defining lies in its subjectivity. This is because one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter [1]. Terrorism is almost unavoidably subjective owing to the usual feelings of sympathy or outright opposition to the cause, perpetrators or victims [13]. The term terrorism means premeditated use of violence against non-combatant groups by clandestine representatives with the intention of influencing the targets and compelling negotiators to agree with their terms or change some policies, which is often to the detriment of the negotiator and by extension the entire population. [14,15] consider terrorism as violence between non-combatant group and sub-national groups. Terrorist groups are not born out of thin air, they are groups shaped by complex and interconnected

environmental, social, political, economic and sometimes religious factors [16]. Terrorism is violence motivated by political, social or religious ideology and used to invoke fear and bring about change [17]. Terrorist groups benefit from transnational organized crime actions, which include but not limited to illicit trade, arms trafficking, etc to fund their dreaded activities [18]. Terrorist actions usually intend to create far-reaching psychological effects on the victims [19]. Hoffman tagged these group non-state armed actors. To him, non-state armed (terrorist) group is distinctive organizations that are;

- i. Willing and capable to use violence to pursue their objectives.
- ii. They are not integrated into formalized state institutions such as regular armies, presidential guards, police or Special Forces. They therefore;
- iii. They possess a certain degree of autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure [20].

Many factors can be attributed to the emergence of terrorist activities within any society [21]. [22] mentions socio-economic factors as a potential driver of extremist activity. According to her, the socio-economic situation of the people within the state, including the lack of employment opportunities and access to education and to social services could determine its resort to extremism. In Nigeria, one of the well known causes of terrorism is Islamic fundamentalism.

2.2 Negotiation

Negotiation is a process of dialogue as a result of perceived incompatibility between parties with the sole intension of reaching a certain level of understanding with each other. It is a process where each party involved in makes adequate efforts to be in the position of advantage by the end of the entire process of bargain or compromise. Negotiation is an integral element of national policy-making processes which graduates from agenda setting, through issues determination to exploring options and finding solutions as well as making plans for the sustenance of the policy(s). [23] Negotiation is one of the most common approaches to make decisions and manage disputes [24].

“There is no gainsaying the fact that there is benefit in successful negotiation with BK. Such benefits includes increasing the

visibility of the dispute; restoration of peace in the region and country; restoration of confidence in the states’ ability to ensure safety of lives and properties; encourage investments/investors; reduce defense expenditure which has since skyrocketed; lifting of emergency rule in affected states with the attendant benefits; removal/reduction in arms proliferation and heavy militarization of the region; and reintegration of dislocated families as well as providing the citizens in the region a sense of belonging in a federation” [24].

John Fitzgerald (Former U.S. President) added that “*Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate*”. According to [25], we negotiate every day without even realizing it.

2.3 Islamic Fundamentalism

Religious fundamentalism as a term originated in the 20th century. It connotes the belief in the existence of only one appropriate religious teaching and any opposing forces as to its intrinsicness, fundamentality, essentiality and inherency, must be vigorously fought and eliminated [26]. It is the belief of fundamentalists that their religion is superior to every other religion and should not be criticized in any manner, rather it should be made compulsory for everyone [27].

2.4 Theoretical Framework

This study adopts the games theory which describes a typical scenario in decision making. Game theory explains the interaction between parties in a situation that contains set rules and outcomes. According to [28], “games theory is a formal study of decision making where two or more players must make choices that potentially affects the interests of the other players. The games theory pictures a scenario whereby two or more players of opposite interests are left with no other option than to makes choices that may potentially affect the interest of their opponent(s). At this point, it is expected of each of these players to be rational and to play in a manner which will maximize his payoff [29]. According to [29], the study of duopoly by Cournot in 1838 was the earliest example of formal games theory analysis. Later, in 1944, von Neumann established the game theory as a field of study in his book titled “the theory of games and behaviours.”

There are several reasons why game theory is suitable for the present study. The game theory X-rays the interactions between the government and terrorist groups. These groups constantly try to understand and act according to how they believe their opponents will react, and they try at every point to gain relative strategic advantage. According to [30], every player tries to maximize gains and avoid possible loss. Finally, uncertainty is inevitable on the parts of these groups (government and terrorists) and a continuous study of the strategic environment operated by opponents is necessary to become victorious in the context.

3. METHODOLOGY

A qualitative method of data analysis was used in this study. According to [31], a qualitative method gives deeper information concerning the nature of communication process in a research. In tackling the research question, data was analyzed for clarity and variety of secondary data were drawn from extant literature, most of which were online Journals, newspapers, magazines and books, to establish the pros and cons of terrorist negotiation by the Nigerian government, using Chibok School girls' abduction as a case study.

4. NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT: FROM PEACE-TALK AGITATIONS TO ACTUAL NEGOTIATION WITH BK

"BK" is translated to mean "Western education is evil or sinful". BK members are bent on promoting the provision of the Sharia which demands tough gender limitations and roles for women (dress, sexual conduct, etc), thereby committing several atrocities on the women, include those (norms) not shared by other Islamic groups [32,33]. Attempts by this Islamic fundamentalist group, to impose its Islamic orientated quest on Nigeria have affected the political, economic and socio-cultural development of the nation [34]. According to [35,36], about 276 Chibok school girls were held captive by the dreaded BK sect on the night of 14th April, 2014. The abduction of the Chibok school girls by BK has generated several controversies, condemnation and panic within and outside Nigeria. Several groups have taken to the streets to protest, as well as mount pressure on the Federal government to fast-track efforts to rescuing the school girls. Prominent among these groups is the *#Bring Back Our*

Girls' whose activities has spread across several countries all over the world [37].

Other prominent Nigerians have agitated for talks between the Federal Government of Nigeria and the dreaded BK sect. Most Popular among the agitators include General Abdulsalami Abubakar, Governor Gabriel Suswan of Benue State, Former President Olusegun Obasanjo, and Sanusi Muhammed, a member National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) [38-40]. Obasanjo, advocated for a carrot-and-stick approach, where carrot represents a plea for peace talk [39]. Sanusi Muhammed (a member National Democratic Coalition, NADECO), posited that getting across to the sect was not as difficult as identifying and applying the proper channel [40]. The non-compliance of BK have been traced to factors ranging from the international media (BBC, Aljazeera, etc) [38], the initiation of talks with the wrong representatives of the sect. For instance, the in-law of the leader of the sect, who is not permitted to hold talks with anyone on issues affecting the group has severally held talks with government representatives [41,42]. The agitations of groups as well as individual prominent Nigerians have left the Federal Government with no option than to negotiate with the sect [43].

4.1 Some Conditions Necessary for Fruitful Negotiations

Now the big question: "*Does negotiation help to end violent terrorist campaigns?*" [44] Cronin further posits;

"An overview of recent efforts in this regard reveals that idealistic platitudes are as misguided as righteous exhortations about the evils of terrorism. After groups survive past the five or six year mark, for example, it is not at all clear that refusing to 'talk to terrorists' shortens their violent campaigns any more than entering into negotiations prolongs them. On the other hand, negotiations can facilitate a process of decline but have rarely been the single factor driving an outcome." [44]

Here, Cronin outlined some promising and unpromising circumstances for negotiation. The promising circumstances, according to him include: First, *political stalemate*; where both sides have reached a level where additional violence is counterproductive. Second, *strong leadership*; negotiation is easier done when both

parties (government and terrorist group) have strong leaders. Third, *timing*; this is the choice, judgment, or control of when to hold talks with terrorist groups. An untimed negotiation is twice as dangerous as the insurgent sect. Fourth, *engaging spoilers*; most actors in a conflict will use spoiling behaviour as a tactic, but this should not be seen as static in their outlook. It is often necessary to seek to understand the behaviour and objectives of groups in conflict in terms of their political context. There should always be an awareness of the presence of 'spoiler' in every conflict. A spoiler is aimed at flawing the peace or settlement process and should be adequately engaged. Fifth, *who to negotiate with*; considering the present state of BK sect in Nigeria with its internal factions, popularly, the Abubakar Shekau and the Abu Musab Al-Barnawi factions, it becomes necessary to critically consider who to negotiate with. A perfect example to this is the peace negotiation dilemma that confronted Sri Lanka, where the Tamil Tigers claimed to be the sole representatives of the Tamil people. They insisted on talks being an exclusive exercise between themselves and the government of Sri Lanka. According to Eiril Solheim, the exercise excluded many relevant groups, including the Muslim community and the Sinhala opposition party and met very little success.

4.2 Some Factors that Contribute to Failed Negotiations

On the one hand, the emerging and swift changes in the modus-operandi of BK sect has made it more difficult to have a fruitful negotiation with the group. According to Perouse de [45], BK has transitioned from insurgent to terrorist group, hitting churches, police stations, military barracks, prisons, etc, and has killed both military personnel and civilians (including Christians and Muslims). The transition from the group's traditional ideology has posed more difficulties on the government and other actors in the negotiation process.

While on the other hand, unpromising circumstances include: First, *suicide campaigns*; here, resolution through negotiation is difficult because the factions are unable to live side-by-side. Second, *splintering*; where the terrorist group splits into several factions (those in support of negotiations and those against it). Third, terrorist negotiation is bound to fail where there is an *existence of spoilers* who are used to derail peace negotiations [46]. Fourth, the

availability of sponsors; who are third party states with much interest in the conflict. According to [47], "the rationality of terrorist negotiation is a function of timing. For any talk to see limelight, a terrorist group must be at a strategic juncture; questioning the utility of violence but not necessarily on the verge of defeat. Governments or negotiators much ensure that the present terrorist group can make good negotiation partner, coupled with a well-planned process, although there is no guarantee that talks process will succeed. It can be seen from the aforementioned that there is absolutely no generally accepted stance by scholars regarding terrorist negotiation. This implies that terrorist negotiation is solely an act of intuition by the government. This lends credence to the position of Powell who noted that talking to terrorists is as morally repugnant as it is politically necessary.

4.3 Experiences with TTP, AQ and AS

Just as it is the case in Nigeria, the British conquered Pakistan and India from the Mughal Dynasty in 1757 [48], and occupied the land until 1947. As at this time, the two dominant religious groups that were found in the territory were the Hindus and the Muslims, who were in constant antagonistic relationship with each other [49]. Today, while the Hindus are predominantly found in India, the Muslims dominant Pakistan who still faces identity problems which has resulted to its choice of terrorism instead of other ways of addressing the issue [50]. A critical look at terrorism in Pakistan, Nigeria and other countries of the world shows that religious as well as ethnic diversities play leading roles in the conflict.

Also, talking about terrorist negotiation in Pakistan, many have criticized the president for negotiating out of fear and political necessity as opposed to engaging in the negotiation as the last resort. Hence, it is widely believed that the peace negotiations between the government of Pakistan and TTP is an effort in futility and can only enhance the regrouping of TTP [51]. It is worthy to note that as negotiation is necessary; its chances of failing exist. For instance, in 2013, it was agreed in the All Parties Conference (APC) of Pakistan that the government should hold peace talk with the TTP [52], but despite the offer for talks, the TTP launched several other attacks in Pakistan. One of these attacks claimed the lives of Maajor General Sanaullah and Lieutenant Colonel Touseef [53,54].

Also, the argument against terrorist negotiation is that it nullifies the efforts of the armed forces, legitimate and promotes the activities of the sect [55]. On the other hand, in order to eliminate these groups, their acclaimed legitimacy, concession, and to further strengthen the concern of government and its efforts in punishing criminals, it is necessary to engage in constant combat with the sect [56]. As was mentioned earlier, terrorist negotiation is morally repugnant as it is politically necessary. Therefore, the later position can be fruitful where the terrorist group in question lacks wide support. However, for sects like the AQ and AS who are strongly tied to ethnic and nationalist constituencies, with a very large population base, coupled with their strong persistence amidst several military options, negotiation becomes the only viable strategy left to be explored. AQ has most of its cells in Middle East, Africa and Asia. The group is bent on removing the US influence and present ties with Israel. As entrenched as AQ is in its belief, which it poses more difficulties on diplomacy and negotiation, continuing military/policing by government is strongly not advised.

5. BK PRISONERS VERSUS CHIBOK SCHOOL GIRLS

On May 6, 2017, the Federal Government of Nigeria exchanged an undisclosed number of BK suspects (some sources mention 5 BK suspects) for 82 kidnapped Chibok girls after several negotiations [57-62]. Apart from handing over five prominent terrorists to BK in exchange for the release of 82 Chibok girls, €2m was also paid to the terrorist group, BBC report [57]. This action by the Federal Government has generated a mixed feeling for both scholars and indigenes of the country. While some (especially relatives of the released girls) are happy, others are left to ponder on the effects (both short and long term) this decision will bring to the country.

However, Islamic fundamentalism has been observed to be a major cause of this crisis. Islamic fundamentalism is the belief in the existence and supremacy of the Islamic religion above every other religion. BK sect is agitating for an Islamic State in Nigeria. Members of this dreaded group believe that an infidel is anyone who practices a religion other than Islamic religion and such a person deserves to die. Also the group is strongly against western education. It claims that western education is evil. Other factors include economic, social, legal and political factors. These factors must be carefully

considered at this point: First, *economic factor*, the government has expended about €2m coupled with other sums on the dreaded BK sect who are bent on destroying the lives and properties of its citizens. Second, *social factor*, government negotiation will likely amount to a geometric increase in the activities of the sect. Third, *legal factor*, the exchange of prisoners for Chibok girls is to a large extent a pervasion of justice for the former, considering that the tenet of justice has been defiled. Fourth, *political factor*, government negotiation with BK portrays weakness and strategic incapability, as securing lives and properties of the citizens remains the traditional goal and real essence of government.

6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Terrorism in Nigeria as perpetuated by BK has contributed severely to the country's instability. Also, the current swap of 5 BK terrorists who were held custody in the Nigerian prison for 82 Chibok school girls has raised several conflicting arguments regarding its rationality. Epistemologically, government after government have pledged at several points never to negotiate with terrorists, but they most often end up doing so, and the Nigerian government is not an exception. Similarly, scholars have taken different stance regarding BK negotiation. Some posit that BK negotiation will legitimize the group, their goals and means. Others believe that there is absolutely no harm in negotiating with the group, especially if the essence of the negotiation is to save the lives of citizens or to possibly reduce their suffering and injuries. It has been a much reiterated fact within this paper that terrorist negotiation is morally repugnant as it is politically necessary. Negotiation process remains an integral element in the country's policy-making process and should graduate from agenda setting, through issues determination to exploring options as well as finding solutions. Correspondingly, even in the negotiation process, some factors like strong and purposeful leadership, political stalemate, timing, spoiler's engagement, as well as a clear identification of who to negotiate with should be carefully considered.

It is therefore the recommendation of this paper that terrorist negotiation in Nigeria should remain as a last resort and should be applied only when every other option prove abortive. The Federal government through its instrument of coercion

should ensure adequate protection for its citizens against terrorism and insurgency. The fight against terrorism should not be left for the Armed Forces alone, relevant bodies, stakeholders and Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be involved. Sensitization programmes should remain on air and awareness should be created on best approaches to self and neighborhood defense. Security alert and proper channels of reporting suspicious movements around the neighbourhood should be made known to the people of Nigeria. Also, International Corporation should be adopted in addressing this problem. On a lighter note, the ability of authorities to inflict casualties on terrorists during a hostage-taking incident limits terrorist success at both the execution and the negotiation stages.

COMPETING INTERESTS

Authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

REFERENCES

1. Lindberg, M. Understanding terrorism in the twenty-first century. Grupo de EstudiosEstrategicos (GEES). Analisis no 7561. 2010;1
2. Whittaker DJ. Terrorism: Understanding the global threat. Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited. 2007;9-10.
3. Cronin AK. When should we talk to terrorists? Special Report. United States Institute of Peace. 2010;1. Available: www.usip.org/
4. Toros H. 'we don't negotiate with terrorists!': Legitimacy and complexity in Terrorist conflicts. Security Dialogue. 2008;39:407. Available:<http://sdi.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/39/4/407>
5. Powell J. We must negotiate with terrorists: The dirty secret our government does not want to admit; 2015. Available:www.salon.com/2015/07/12/we_must_negotiate_with_terrorists_the_dirty_secret_our_governemnt_does_not_want_to_admit/
6. Powell J. Talking to terrorists. How to end armed conflicts. No time to hold your P. Books: (N.d); 38.
7. Arin KP, Feess E, Reich FM. Negotiating with terrorists: the costs of compliance. University of Otago; 2011. Available:www.otago.ac.nz
8. Hyatt R. Granting concessions and paying ransoms to terrorists: A policy options analysis of the U.S. policy on hostage recovery. Thesis. Naval Postgraduate school, Monterey, California; 2016.
9. Eze OS. Media and reportage of BK insurgency. The Sun, April 23, 2014.
10. Duke OO, Odey O, Etim EE. The role of state in curbing ethnic and Religious crises in Nigeria as a federation. International Journal of Advanced Research in Public Policy, Social Development and Enterprise Studies. 2017;2(1);13-25.
11. Etim EE, Odey J, Duke OO. International politics of oil monomania and food security: The nigerian case. Asian Research Journal of Arts & Social Sciences. 2017;3(4):1-11. Available:http://www.journalrepository.org/media/journals/ARJASS_45/2017/Aug/Etim342017ARJASS31631.pdf
12. Shola OJ. Globalization of terrorism: A case study of Boko-Haram in Nigeria. International Journal of Politics and Good Governance. 2015;VI(6.1).
13. Diaz- Paniagua CF. Negotiating Terrorism: The negotiation dynamics of four United Nations counter-terrorism treaties. University of New York; 2008
14. Wadlaw G. The Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter Measures: London; 1982.
15. Tilly C. Terror as strategy and relational process. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi. 2005;46;1-2.
16. Hoffman B. 'Defining terrorism'. Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. New York; 1998.
17. United Nations Security Council. Reports of the secretary-General, 'Small arms and light weapons' 27th April, 2015.
18. Hoffman B. Inside terrorism, revised and expanded edition. New York: Columbia UP. 2006;2-32.
19. Hoffman B, Schneckener U. Engaging non-state armed actors in state and peace-building: options and strategies. International review of the Red Cross. 2011;93(883):2-3
20. Malasowe GC. State failure and terrorism: thoughts on Nigeria's festering BK crisis. International Journal of Academic

- Research in Business and Social Sciences. 2016;6(2).
Available:[http://hrmars.com/hrmars_papers/State Failure And Terrorism Thoughts on Nigeria%E2%80%99s Festering BOK O Haram Crisis.pdf](http://hrmars.com/hrmars_papers/State_Failure_And_Terrorism_Thoughts_on_Nigeria%E2%80%99s_Festering_BOK_O_Haram_Crisis.pdf)
21. Haider H ed. Drivers of Extremism. Birmingham, AL: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. 2007;3.
22. Alfredson T, Cungu A. Negotiation theory and practice a review of the literature. FAO Policy Learning Programme. 2008;2. Available:[http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/550/4-5 negotiation background paper 179en.pdf](http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/550/4-5_negotiation_background_paper_179en.pdf)
23. Agbebaku, Phillip E, Odion, William E, Edokpa, Mary Fadal. "Tackling Nigeria's security challenges: Negotiation or what with BK?," Journal of Global Initiatives: Policy, Pedagogy, Perspective: 2014;9:2, Article 7.
Available:<http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jgi/vol9/iss2/7>
24. Temitayo BA. Negotiation as a tool for dispute resolution and conflict management in a changing world. International Journal of Renovation Research. 2014;3(8).
Available:www.ijird.com
25. Turocy L, von Stengel. Game theory. CDAM Research Report LSE-CDAM-2001-09. Prepared for the Encyclopedia of Information Systems. Academic Press; 2002.
26. Koopmans, R. Religious fundamentalism and out-group hostility among muslims and christians in Western Europe Presentation at the 20th International Conference of Europeanists Amsterdam, 25-27 June, 2013.
Available:https://www.wzb.eu/sites/default/files/u8/ruud_koopmans_religious_fundamentalism_and_out-group_hostility_among_muslims_and_christian.pdf
27. Naf OS. What Is Religious Fundamentalism? Worldatlas; 2017. Available:<http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-religious-fundamentalism.html>
28. Turocy TL. Game Theory. Texas A&M University. Bernhard von Stengel. London School of Economics CDAM Research Report LSE-CDAM-2001-09 October 8, 2001.
Available:<http://www.cdam.lse.ac.uk/Reports/Files/cdam-2001-09.pdf>
29. Sandler T, Daniel GA. A Terrorism and game theory. Cambridge University Press. 2003;34(30).
30. Duke OO, Odey J, Etim EE.. the role of state in curbing ethnic and religious crises in Nigeria as a federation. International Journal of Advanced Research in Public Policy, Social Development and Enterprise Studies. 2017;2(1):17.
31. Zenn J, Pearson E. 'Women, Gender, and the Evolving Tactics of BK', in Journal of Terrorism Research, 2014;5(1):46-57.
32. Loimeier R. 'BK: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria,' in Africa Spectrum. 2012;47:137-155
33. Otu DO, Agbaji, Dickson David, Etim EE. The upsurging waves of islamic fundamentalism and the case for Nigeria's development: Institution, structural processes and system. International Journal of Innovative Research & Development. 2016;5(13):219-226. Available:www.ijird.com
34. BBC News. "Nigeria Kidnapped Girls Shown in BK Video," 2014; 12 May.
35. Okoro E. "Global uproar over missing Chibok girls," 23 May, 2014.
36. Uchehara KE. Peace Talks initiatives between the BK and Nigerian Government. International Journal of Business and Social Science. 2014;5,6(1):131-138.
37. Abubakar A. Urges dialogue with BK, A former Nigerian Leader, on Saturday called on the Government to Engage in Dialogue with the BK Sect to end the Insecurity in Northern Nigeria; 2013. Available:<http://pmnewsnigeria.com/2013/01/12/abdulsalami-urges-dialogue-with-boko-haram/>. (Accessed 1/12/2013).
38. Campbell J. To Battle Nigeria's BK, Put down Your Guns. Foreign Affairs Spotlight. 2011;2013. Available:<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68249/john-campbell/to-battle-nigerias-boko-haram-put-downyour-guns>
39. Brandler J. BK: Fighting Fire with Fire; 2012. Available:<http://thinkafricapress.com/nigeria/counterterrorism-boko-haram-fire>.
40. Egunjobi L, Odiaka NOW. () "The Negotiation Issues in Nigeria's Post-Independence Conflicts," Journal of Global

- Initiatives: Policy, Pedagogy, Perspective. 2014;2012;9(2):5. Available:<http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jgi/vol9/iss2/5>
41. Njoku L. Igbo Seek N2.4tr Compensation for Violations, Killings since 1966. The Guardian, (2014, March 7). p. 5. Retrieved from Available:<http://www.theguardianmobile.com/readNewsItem1.php?nid=23408>
 42. Cronin AK. Negotiating with groups that use terrorism: Lessons for policy-makers. Section 2 Background papers. 2008;5-9. Available:<https://www.osloforum.org/sites/default/files/Audrey%20Kurth-%20Cronin%20Negotiating%20with%20groups%20that%20use%20terrorism.pdf>
 43. Bradford E, Wilson MA. 'When terrorists attack schools: An exploratory analysis of attacks on educational institutions,' in Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology. 2013;28:127-138.
 44. Pérouse de Montclos M. BK and politics: From insurgency to terrorism. 137-152. Available:http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/divers15-04/010064363.pdf
 45. Kydd A, Barbara F. Walter, Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence, International Organization. 2002;Spring56(2):264; using data from the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism database, the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya; and Walter's Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002).
 46. Neumann PR. Negotiating with terrorist. Foreign Affairs. 2007;86(1);128-138.
 47. Gil RN. The new global terrorist threat: A case of pakistani identity and global Jihad. A Master's Thesis Presented the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Brandeis University; August, 2010
 48. Ahmed, Manzoor. "Islam and the Pakistani Polity." Pakistan: the Contours of State and Society . Ed. Soofia Mumtaz, Jean Racine, and Imran Ali. Karachi; Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002;56-76.
 49. Ganguly Sumit. "The Islamic Dimensions of the Kashmir Insurgency." Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation ? Ed. Christophe Jaffrelot. New Delhi: Manohar; 2000.
 50. Middle East Policy Council. Pakistan Begins Negotiations with Taliban Middle East In Focus. Available:<http://www.mepec.org/commentary/pakistan-begins-negotiations-taliban>
 51. Mannan A. "APC: Political Leaders Decide on Taliban Talks as First Step", The Express Tribune(Islamabad) with the International New York Tribune (New York), September 9, 2013, accessed January 20, 2014, at; Available:<http://tribune.com.pk/story/601864/prior-to-apc-imran-khan-briefly-meets-kayani-nawaz/>.
 52. Yusufzai R. "Gen Sanullah the 4th General to Die Fighting Militants", The News International, (Rawalpindi) September 16, 2013, Available:<http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-25492-Gen-Sanullah-the-4th-general-to-die-fighting-militants> (accessed September 17, 2013)
 53. Khan RM. Negotiations with TTP: An Analysis of Counter Terrorism Strategy NDU Journal 2013. Available:http://www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/ndu-journal/NDU-Journal-2013/04-Negotiations-with-TTP.pdf
 54. Neumann R. Peter. "Negotiating with Terrorists" Foreign Affairs. 2007;86(1): 128-138.
 55. Pruitt G. Dean. "Negotiation with Terrorists." International Negotiation 2006;11:371-394.
 56. Punch Nigeria. FG swaps 82 Chibok girls with BK prisoners. Published May 21, 2017 Available:<http://punchng.com/fg-swaps-82-chibok-girls-with-boko-haram-prisoners/>
 57. The Guardian. 82 Chibok schoolgirls freed in exchange for five BK leaders; 2017 Available:<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/07/chibok-schoolgirls-families-await-as-82-are-freed-by-boko-haram-exchange-prison>
 58. Premium Times Nigeria. 82 Chibok Girls: Why we helped Nigeria negotiate with BK – Switzerland govt. Published May 9, 2017. Available:<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/230786-82-chibok-girls-helped-nigeria-negotiate-boko-haram-switzerland-govt.html>
 59. Reuters. Nigeria exchanges 82 Chibok girls kidnapped by BK for prisoners. Published May 6, 2017.

- Available:<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-idUSKBN1820P1>
60. Naij.com. 5 BK members swapped for 82 Chibok girls – Negotiator. Available:<https://www.naij.com/1103611-5-boko-haram-members-swapped-82-chibok-girls-negotiator.html>
61. Sahara Reporters. BK Commanders Released In Swap Deal For 82 Chibok Girls Issue Threat To Bomb Abuja. Available:<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-idUSKBN1820P1>
62. CBC News. Nigeria exchanges prisoners for 82 Chibok girls kidnapped by BK. Published May 12, 2017. Available:<http://saharareporters.com/2017/05/12/boko-haram-commanders-released-swap-deal-82-chibok-girls-issue-threat-bomb-abuja>
62. CBC News. Nigeria exchanges prisoners for 82 Chibok girls kidnapped by BK. Published May 12, 2017. Available:<http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/chibok-schoolgirl-found-1.4103285>

© 2018 Abumbe et al.; This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Peer-review history:
The peer review history for this paper can be accessed here:
<http://www.sciencedomain.org/review-history/22913>