

Considering the Power of Contemporary Poland – Hans J. Morgenthau’s Inspirations and Some Remarks on the Power Relations in East-Central Europe

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Abstract

This article refers to Hans J. Morgenthau’s concept of power as a useful background in the analysis of power of contemporary Poland and its neighbours – Germany and Russia. It considers some problems with the evaluation of power of Poland as well as some specific features of the power relations in East-Central Europe. Considering the idea of power present in Morgenthau’s political thought the author indicates the flexibility of this concept as well as some Morgenthau’s warnings against a narrow and single-factor understanding of power. Discussing the power of Poland the article underlines both material and some less tangible factors, including the social reception of the liberal reforms. The relations of Poland with Russia and Germany illustrate the relative character of power as both neighbours remain much more powerful countries in any aspects of power defined by Morgenthau. Besides, the Morgenthau’s concept of power helps to identify some regional problems that may destabilize the political relations in Europe. Thus the effective Polish foreign policy should be based on the proper evaluation of power and intentions of its two key neighbours as well as the understanding of mechanisms accompanying the power relations in the region.

Keywords: Morgenthau, power, Poland, Germany, Russia

1. Introduction

Discussing its concept of power Hans J. Morgenthau urges that any serious analysis of power relations in any region of the world would be difficult without a reference to a broad catalogue of determinants accompanying regional relations as well as the dynamic and changing character of power itself. Indeed, dynamic and comprehensive understanding of power in Morgenthau’s political thought remains a useful guideline in analyzing contemporary international relations, and especially the relations in East-Central Europe. The case of Poland and its neighbours – Germany and Russia is crucial in this regard as the analysis refers to a medium size country with a rich history and political ambitions. The country, however, that is geopolitically located between two much more powerful states.

Thus, seen from the perspective of Hans J. Morgenthau’s realism, the successful Polish foreign policy should be based on realist evaluation of the power of Germany and Russia as well as awareness of the limits of the national power of Poland. It should be conscious of the dynamic character of the power relations in East-Central Europe as well as the existence of factors that may destabilize regional relations.

This article refers to Hans J. Morgenthau’s concept of power and its usefulness in analysis of power of Poland and its two key neighbours. It is going to discuss some aspects of the evaluation of power of Poland, Russia and Germany. At the same time the article outlines some general features of the power relations in East-Central Europe. In doing so, it recalls some obvious power-related facts that, if ignored, may be a source of Polish problems and frustrations. The article will certainly not explain all aspects of the power relations in the region. Its aim, however, is to draw the readers’ attention to the need for proper evaluation of power in the dynamic and changing political environment of this region. Morgenthau’s political thought will be an interesting background for any such evaluation.

2. Hans J. Morgenthau's Concept of Power – Some Inspirations for Contemporary International Relations

The concept of power is one of the central ideas in Hans J. Morgenthau's political thought. Power is the key to Morgenthau's understanding of politics and the struggle for power is a universal feature of any political activity (Morgenthau, 2010, p. 47; Scheuerman, 2009, pp. 36-38). To be sure, Morgenthau distances himself from Carl Schmitt and Schmitt's brutal understanding of politics as a mortal combat between "friend" and "foe". Morgenthau opposes untamed power politics and argues that the principal aim of any responsible leadership must be to limit the struggle for power and to master the presence of power in politics (Morgenthau, 2010, p. 221; Lebow, 2003, p. 225). Nevertheless, it does not change the fact that, even when tamed and limited, power in the realism of Morgenthau is fundamental for any understanding of politics.

Indeed, the concept of power serves as a guideline helping to understand the power relations on the international scene. Morgenthau states in this regard that "The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood" (Morgenthau, 2005, p. 5). Thus, any foreign policy that ignores the presence of power in international relations as well as leaves out the reality of power relations in any region of the world risks serious consequences of these mistakes.

Nonetheless, considering the concept of power Hans J. Morgenthau indicates that a narrow understanding, limiting the idea of power to the country's military capabilities, would be a next mistake in any serious analysis of international politics. The military potential remains an important element in the evaluation of the country's power yet the concept of power in Morgenthau's realism refers more to psychological relations between two sides. "When we speak of power, we mean man's control over the minds and actions of other man". "Political power, however, must be distinguished from force in the sense of the actual exercise of physical violence" (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 13).

Thus, power in the realism of Hans J. Morgenthau is a complex phenomenon. It has its clear material aspects, to include the country's military preparedness, industrial capacity, natural resources as well as its population and geopolitical position. Nevertheless, the idea of power has its ideational and more variable aspects. Morgenthau indicates in this regard the problems of national character, social support for political elites, the quality of government and diplomacy. Most of these factors are less tangible than the material components of power yet they may be crucial for the country's foreign relations and any serious analysis of power cannot ignore them (Morgenthau, 2010, pp. 135, 153; Williams, 2005, pp. 109-110). Besides, seen from the perspective of Morgenthau's realism, power is a dynamic and not fully predictable phenomenon. To be sure, political analysts may identify some tendencies and determinants present in the power relations yet the best they can do is "to indicate certain trends and to state the possible conditions under which one of those trends is most likely to materialize in the future" (Morgenthau, 1947, p. 119).

Furthermore, any realist evaluation of power should avoid some typical errors. Identifying them Morgenthau underlines that "The first disregards the relativity of power by erecting the power of one particular nation into an absolute. The second takes for granted the permanency of a certain factor which has in the past played a decisive role, thus overlooking the dynamic change to which most power factors are subject. The third attributes to one single factor a decisive importance to the neglect of all the others" (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 112).

Indeed, any single-factor analysis of power and politics would be a serious mistake and Morgenthau's dynamic concept of power remains valid also in contemporary international relations. Morgenthau is at the same time right when he underlines a broad context of determinants accompanying any power relations in any region of the world. This comprehensive and dynamic understanding of power proposed by Morgenthau seems to be useful in the case of Poland – an ambitious medium size country with a specific geopolitical location between two much more powerful neighbours. Besides, the case of Poland reminds that power in international relations is relative as it must be compared with the powers of neighbours and other regional actors.

3. Discussing the Power of Contemporary Poland – Internal Determinants of the Polish Power

The evaluation of power in the case of Poland is difficult as it refers to the state in deep social, political and economic transition after the fall of the bipolar order. Poland has successfully passed the transition exam and joined the Euro-Atlantic community yet the country still faces some internal and international challenges inherited from the cold war past. Thus, any realist evaluation of the Polish power, inspired by Morgenthau's political thought, will certainly show a dynamic catalogue of internal and international determinants behind the political processes in Poland. It will indicate that the contemporary social and political reality in Poland is

shaped by different and sometimes contradictory factors; some of them inherited from the communist period of the Polish Peoples Republic (the PRL) yet others reaching even deeper in the turbulent history of the country (Davies, 2001, p. 312).

The general assessment of the Polish power will indicate a medium size country with a demographic potential (38 million inhabitants) that exceeds the European average yet that remains lower than the potential of both crucial Polish neighbours – Germany and Russia. It will show a developing state with a level of social wealth significantly lower than in the most developed countries in Europe (GNI PPP per capita at about twenty one thousand USD in 2012) but certainly much higher than in the previous communist period of the Polish Peoples Republic (the PRL). The picture of the Polish power will indicate a competitive economy (ranked 24th world economy according to the World Bank 2012 nominal GDP index), a successful story of social and economic modernization as well as the dynamism and creativity of people (Note 1). Similarly, it will illustrate a level of political stability, respect for human and minority rights as well as a quality of social services that locate Poland at the 39th rank according to the 2012 HDI Index (UNDP, 2013, p. 143). This may not be an impressive result if compared with the most developed countries of the European Union yet, having in mind heavy losses during the Second World War and 45-year communist period in Poland after the end of the war, the achievements are remarkable.

More careful analysis, however, will show some serious problems as well as social, political and economic tendencies that will contribute to limited predictability of the Polish politics. It will outline a more complex picture of the Polish reality. Indeed, a more in depth analysis will note that the social dynamism is accompanied by the reluctance of some segments of the Polish society to “cruel capitalism” and social costs of liberal reforms (Vanhuysse, 2006, pp. 13-15; Galasińska & Galasiński, 2010, pp. 2, 12). Social frustrations will contribute to the weakness of mechanisms of civil society as well as to emigration, especially among the younger generation of the Poles. Furthermore, expectations of the paternalistic role of the state and calls for social privileges similar to those during the communist period may strengthen a tendency to populism (Grabowska & Szawiel, 2003, pp. 124-126; Markowski, 2004, pp. 12-13). Besides, Poland still faces some structural problems (pension system, agriculture), that have not been resolved, as well as bureaucracy and limited effectiveness of public administration (Rose-Ackerman, 2005, pp. 29-30). The political system is stable yet not fully consolidated and the level of antagonism among the main political forces hardly supports social and political dialogue in the country (Antoszewski, 2000, pp. 70-72). In fact, some reforms in Poland have had a more declarative than real character and there are some fundamental issues in the Polish economy and society, to mention the reform of the pension system, negative demographic trends and difficulties with the country’s family policy that may be a source of serious future problems.

Furthermore, any realist analysis, based on Morgenthau’s political thought, will note some less tangible components of the Polish power. It will indicate long and turbulent history of the country, including the 123-year period of the partition of Poland, as well as some specific features of the Polish national character. Thus, it will certainly indicate the Polish honor, courage and dedication. Yet it must at the same time note excessive Polish individualism as well as historically-rooted tendency to anarchy and disrespect for law (Sanford, 2002, pp. 2-4). It will show a strong sense of belonging to the Western culture but at the same time the historical existence on the border between the West and the East of Europe. Those less tangible factors will not only be a part of debates on social identities in contemporary Poland (as constructivists and postmodernists would focus on). They will influence real political decisions and peoples’ choices, including the level of social support for political elites and confidence for new democratic mechanisms (Rose-Ackerman, 2005, pp. 24-26, 34-35).

Finally, any analysis referring to Morgenthau’s realism will take note of the relativity of the Polish power. The last 25 years of democracy and liberal transformation have considerably strengthened the power of Poland in any aspects of this concept indicated by Hans J. Morgenthau. The power of Poland seems considerable in comparison with some of its neighbours (Lithuania, Slovakia or even Ukraine). Yet it is still not comparable with the power of two its crucial neighbours – Russia and Germany and both countries are simply much more powerful political actors. Thus, the case of Poland could be a good example of the Morgenthau’s conclusions about the relative character of power. Besides, Poland’s geopolitical position between two much more powerful countries means that any change in the foreign policy of Germany and Russia may significantly influence any considerations about the Polish power.

4. Poland between Germany and Russia – International Context of the Polish Power

Considering the international context, the analysis of the power of Poland will certainly indicate a specific geopolitical position of the country between Germany and Russia – two more powerful regional powers. Yet it

will underline participation of Poland in NATO and the European Union – the regional mechanisms of security and integration that help to mitigate and tame the struggle for power in Europe. In the case of Poland the membership in both communities serves not only the security interests of the country but also helps to overcome potential negative consequences of the Polish geopolitical location. More careful analysis, however, will show some problems with the effectiveness of NATO, internal disputes inside the Alliance as well as the Polish military potential that has recently been modernized but remains partly incompatible with the forces of the Allies. It will indicate a deep crisis of European integration as well as the limited effectiveness of the EU's structures and mechanisms (Fischer, 2013, pp. 22-24, 45-47).

Nevertheless, it seems that the most important Polish neighbors – Germany and Russia – still function in two different security and political environments determining the way in which their foreign policy is conducted. In the case of Germany, the German foreign policy exists in the frames of the European Union, irrespective of Berlin's ambitions to reshape the relations of power in the EU and the internal problems of the community. The frames of the European Union still provide for relatively strong mechanisms to limit the struggle for power among the EU members. In the case of the Russian Federation, however, potential mechanisms able to moderate the Russian foreign policy are much weaker. Russia does not accept any multilateral agreements that could limit the flexibility of its foreign policy and Moscow is reluctant to any international obligation that could narrow the freedom of its own decisions (Gower, 2007, pp. 122-128; Gomart, 2008, p. 2). Besides, in some cases (and especially on the post-Soviet area) Russia is ready to use more brutal and violent instruments – other than persuasion, negotiation and compromise typical for the diplomacy of the European Union.

In fact, discussing the Polish-Russian relations any realist analysis will note that Russia is much more powerful country than Poland in every aspect of power defined by Morgenthau. The Polish territory is incomparable with that of Russia (Note 2) and the Polish demographic potential is almost four times lower than Russian (Note 3). In the context of the military power, Russia is the second nuclear power in the world and even the conventional military potential of Russia is much higher than that of Poland. To be sure, Russia is not the world leader in military expenditures and Russian military industry may compete with the US only in some segments of weapon and technology. Yet the modernization of the Russian conventional forces is in progress and Russian military capabilities are still impressive not only in comparison with Poland but also with almost all European armies (Oliker & Crane et al., 2009, pp. 63-68; Oldberg, 2011, pp. 46-47).

At the same time the Russian Federation is considerably stronger than Poland in terms of economic power if compare the nominal GDP indicators (Note 4). This picture, however, is a bit modified when compares Human Development Index illustrating better conditions of life in Poland than in Russia (UNDP, 2013, p. 143). Trade turnover between both sides increased to almost 39 billion USD in 2012 yet there is still a considerable trade imbalance in the case of Poland – with the Polish export at the level of 9,9 billion USD and import from Russia reaching 28 billion USD (Note 5). The main item in the Polish import and the most important aspect of these relations, however, is the Polish dependence on the oil and gas supplies from Russia. Despite some important Polish projects aimed at limiting this dependence (to mention the LNG terminal that is built in Świnoujście) the problem of natural resources dependence on Russia will certainly remain on the top of the Polish political and economic agenda.

Indeed, irrespective of some efforts to increase the global competitiveness of the Russian economy (that has never been the most competitive and technologically advanced in the world) the export of gas and oil provides a considerable share of the Russian state revenues (Oliker & Crane et al., 2009, pp. 46-47, 55-56). Besides, the natural resources play a sensitive role not only in the Russian economy. The leaders of the energy sector are a part of the Kremlin political establishment and the export of oil and gas remains an instrument of Moscow's political pressure on the countries in the Russian neighbourhood. Thus, the Polish-Russian economic relations have never been purely economic and politics accompanies any serious Russian economic decisions. The latest Russian ban on Polish pork products (Donnan and Waever, 2014) would be a good example in this regard as it is difficult to consider it without any reference to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the Polish political support for the Ukrainian side.

To be sure, the ability of Russia to exert its political and economic pressure on Poland and other countries in East-Central Europe (the former satellites of the USSR) has decreased after the countries in the region joined NATO and the European Union. Yet neither NATO nor the EU has so far been unified in its policy towards Russia and dependence on Russian natural resources is a problem of the whole European Union. It gives Moscow some opportunities to take advantage of the EU internal disputes for its own aims (Kaczynski, 2008, pp. 3-4, 15; Raik, 2007, pp. 207-212). Many experts note in this regard limited ability of Europe to influence the

Russian foreign policy and a Russian tendency to develop good bilateral relations only with some selected, and usually the most powerful, countries of the EU (Timmins, 2007, pp. 169-172).

Furthermore, there is a clear divergence of the Polish and Russian interests in the context of regional and subregional relations. The Kremlin has never lost its plans to re-integrate the post-Soviet area under the Russian leadership. Moscow has been using different instruments to this end, including the economic dependence of the CIS countries on Russian energy supplies (Skak, 2011, pp. 139-140, 143-149; Oldberg, 2011, p. 51). Poland, on its part, has tried to play a role of advocate of some Eastern European countries in their relations with the West yet the Polish ability to influence the foreign policy of the Russian Federation (as well as the position of the EU) has usually been limited. Besides, the Polish "interference" in the "Russian zone of influence" has irritated Moscow and contributes to tensions in the Polish-Russian relations.

In fact, the mechanisms to mitigate the tensions and to tame possible struggle for power in the Polish-Russian bilateral relations have been very limited. Fully aware of the evident difference of power between Poland and Russia Moscow has never considered Poland an equal partner. Poland's membership in NATO and the European Union has changed this imbalance yet any real possibility to modify the position of the Kremlin to the benefit of Poland depends on the Polish ability to convince its European and American partners to its point of view. This, however, has been a difficult task for Poland and, facing the game of interests in the European Union, the EU's policy on Russia has for a long time been more a point of Polish disappointment than satisfaction.

Poland has been successful in revealing some real aims of the Russian foreign policy to its partners in the European Union. Poland and Sweden were at the same time the authors of the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative. All of those efforts, however, do not change the picture of power relations in the EU and the fact that the policy of the European Union towards Russia is decided more in Berlin and Paris than in Warsaw and Stockholm. Besides, the contemporary crisis with the identity of the European Union weakens the mechanisms of regional integration and contributes to the growing role of national interests inside the European Union, with a focus on the interests of the most powerful EU members.

As a result, any analysis referring to Morgenthau's realism would warn Poland not to fall into wishful thinking and political mirages when planning its foreign policy goals. Poland should avoid a mistake of outlining too ambitious political aims that exceed the country's power, including its position in the European Union and NATO and its impact on the EU's policy on Russia. A realist Polish foreign policy means knowledge of the political reality, including a broader catalogue of determinants accompanying the EU-Russia relations, as well as awareness of the limits of the country's own power (Timmins, 2007, pp. 169-172). This acceptance for the reality does not mean passivity. The minimal task of the Polish foreign policy is to remind the most powerful actors in the European Union about the Polish interests. Building any further capabilities to influence the EU's policy, however, is a more complex process of strengthening the country's power. It would entail internal political stability and modernization of the Polish economy but also the image of Poland as a credible and responsible partner in the European community (Kaczynski, 2008, pp. 3-4, 15).

Indeed, the image of the country and its ability to support its own interpretations of international processes (in a realist and not postmodernist terms) seem crucial for Poland and its relations with Russia. The struggle over interpretations of international events and processes accompanies the Polish-Russian relations and reflects a clear divergence of both sides' interests. The picture of Russia in the Polish propaganda is focused on Russian imperial ambitions as well as Moscow's attempts to re-establish the Soviet zone of influence, including the gas and oil blackmail against the Russian neighbours. Polish politicians have emphasized serious problems with the Russian democracy as well as lack of political and social freedoms in Russia (Bieleń, 2011, pp. 16-21, 30-33). In response, Russian propaganda has usually ignored Poland as an international actor and pictures it as an irresponsible state unable to compromise. Poland, in this picture, is a country that does not understand a broader context of the Russian transformation and Polish Russophobia may deteriorate further development of the EU-Russian relations (Oldberg, 2007, pp. 22-23; Raik, 2007, pp. 212-213).

Nevertheless, the realist analysis, based on Morgenthau's political thought, will focus not only on the interpretations and images created by both sides (as postmodernism would do). It would underline the power that Poland and Russia are ready to engage to support their points of view. It would combine the effectiveness of propaganda with other elements of the state's power as well as readiness to use them all to support the country's position. Seen from this perspective, the comparison of the force of Polish and Russian arguments shows again a clear preponderance of the Russian Federation, its propaganda and its public diplomacy. Indeed, Russia seems to be more efficient in using different kinds of PR, e-diplomacy and other instruments shaping Russia's international image (Fischer, 2010, pp. 45, 53-56; Tsygankov, 2010, p. 226). Cold-war experience seems crucial

in this regard and Ariel Cohen is right when he emphasizes that during the cold-war period the Soviet Union was an ideological power with an arsenal of instruments serving the communist propaganda. Contemporary Russia draws from these experiences and control of the Kremlin over the Russian mass media helps to create the image of friend or foe (Cohen, 2012, pp. 198-201). Thus, left alone (and without any support of its Allies) Poland is hardly able to face this propaganda machine and to defend its point of view.

Considering the power of Germany, the second important neighbour of Poland, its demographic potential exceeds twice the potential of Poland. The military power of the German state is not (having in mind the consequences of the Second World War) equal with those of the leading world nuclear powers. Nevertheless, the German army is larger, more modern and much better equipped than the Polish Armed Forces. Similarly the economic power of Germany, the leading economy in Europe, by far exceeds the potential of Poland. In fact, the German economic potential is even stronger than that of Russia and the recent economic crisis in Europe seems to confirm the strength and healthy foundations of the German economy (Götz, 2012, p. 4). Furthermore, any analysis based on Morgenthau's realism would note that the power of Germany is strengthened not only by its organizational abilities but also by the skilful creation of the country's international image. The image of open and dynamic German society interested in the success of the European community (Miskimmon, 2007, pp. 34-35).

As a result, Germany is much more powerful country than Poland in any aspects of the Morgenthau's understanding of power. Contrary to Russia, however, the German power is still moderated and tamed by the European integration processes. To be sure, the membership of Poland and Germany in NATO and the European Union does not mean a harmony of interests between them. Yet the acceptance of both states of the same rules of the political game contributes to self-restriction and community context of their foreign activities. Thus, German foreign policy has (to a greater or lesser extent) to take note of the Polish point of view and the EU institutions give Poland an opportunity to remind the politicians in Berlin about the Polish interests. It is not difficult to agree that without the Polish membership in the European Union the possibilities of Poland to influence the foreign policy of Germany would be more limited.

The political role of Germany in the European Union has significantly increased after the fall of the bipolar order and German diplomacy has been indicating a need of new European mechanisms better reflecting the place and role of the German state. Claus Hofhansel notes in this regard that the German enthusiasm towards some multilateral frames of its foreign policy has faded (Hofhansel, 2005, pp. 2-3). Yet the growing power of Germany does not seem to undermine the European foundations of the German foreign policy. It is more a discussion about new mechanisms of effective European leadership, which would be impossible without active participation of Germany, than a real loss of the European context of the German power (Fischer, 2013, p. 44). Similarly, the fact that Germany lost its status of the NATO frontier country after the Eastern enlargement of the Alliance encouraged Berlin to the more independent point of view, including its criticism towards the US operation in Iraq as well as some other prestigious steps to mark its own (independent of Washington) position in global affairs (Miskimmon, 2007, p. 12; Fischer, 2013, p. 36). Nevertheless, NATO still plays a fundamental role in the German security policy and the foreign policy of Germany is more the policy of power shifting within the existing frames than the policy of creating a new European order.

Thus, the realist lesson from the Polish geopolitical position would be at least twofold. First, any realist analysis based on Hans J. Morgenthau's political thought will certainly emphasize the ability of Poland to assess the power and political intentions of Germany and Russia as well as to properly evaluate changes in regional and global environment. It will warn about possible mistakes in this evaluation and a danger of static analysis losing the dynamic character of political changes in Europe (Morgenthau, 2010, p. 176). Second, the analysis referring to Morgenthau's realism will draw the Polish attention to weakening mechanisms of regional integration that have so far mitigated the struggle for power in Europe. It seems that the collapse of these mechanisms would be dangerous for Poland both from the perspective of the Polish-Russian and the Polish-German relations. Left alone, Poland would face the brutality of the Russian foreign policy and Moscow's disrespect for less powerful nations. It would at the same time witness the gradual fall of the community context of the German foreign policy as well as a loss of Germany's interest in its relations with its Polish neighbor. Following the Morgenthau's recommendations Poland must be aware of a possible deterioration of the security environment in Europe as well as the limited Polish ability to respond to these problems alone (Morgenthau, 1952, pp. 972-973; Molloy, 2006, p. 85).

5. Conclusions

Hans J. Morgenthau's dynamic understanding of power offers the interesting background for the analysis of the power of contemporary Poland and its neighbours – Russia and Germany. Morgenthau is right when he

underlines both material and ideational aspects of power and warns against a single-factor approach to power relations in any region of the world. He is convincing when he recommends not to overestimate any components of national power and not to take for granted any shape of international order. Finally, he is quite right when he warns that politics will never be fully predictable.

Thus, Morgenthau's concept of power helps to understand contradictory determinants of the Polish internal political life. It will indicate a broad context of the Polish foreign policy and first of all the specific geopolitical position of Poland between two more powerful neighbours. Similarly, the realist analysis, based on the political thought of Hans J. Morgenthau, will emphasize dynamic changes that may occur on the international scene. It will certainly warn that even the membership of Poland in NATO and the European Union does not release Poland from a permanent evaluation of the power of its neighbours and the rules of the regional game.

Indeed, it seems that the current economic crisis in the European Union as well as the conflict between Russia and the West over the future of Ukraine will change the rules of regional relations. The realist analysis is going to help Poland to understand this process, to define its own interests and to develop a strategy of reaction (alone and in cooperation with the Allies). Besides, the geopolitical position of Poland as well as the community context of its foreign policy is crucial in this regard. The collapse of the mechanisms of regional integration and security cooperation would seriously affect Poland's relations with Germany. Left alone, Poland would also more tangibly face the brutality of the Russian foreign policy. As a result, the realist evaluation of the power relations in its neighbourhood is fundamental for the future of Polish security and development.

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Notes

Note 1. According to The World Bank's Data Base. Retrieved April 25, 2014, from <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx>

Note 2. 312,679 square kilometers in comparison with 17,098,242 square kilometers in the case of Russia.

Note 3. The population of 38,186,860 inhabitants in Poland in comparison with 143,700,000 inhabitants in Russia.

Note 4. According to the World Bank's Data Base. Retrieved April 25, 2014, from <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx>

Note 5. Information provided by the Polish Ministry of Economy at the Polish Export Promotion Portal. Retrieved April 25, 2014, from <http://www.exporter.gov.pl/Informacja/Informacja.aspx?Id=60678>

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